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1. Introduction
It is well known that an initial public offering (IPO) involves problems regarding
price discovery. The market is not certain about the quality of the IPO firm, while
the issuing firm does not know the market demand for its shares. Issuers therefore
delegate the offer price decision to an investment bank that underwrites the IPO
(Baron 1982). Because underwriters repeatedly bring firms public, they have
strong incentives to build a reputation as valuation experts and certify that the offer
price reflects fundamental value (Ibbotson and Ritter 1995).
In practice, underwriters determine an ex ante estimate of the fair or market
value of the IPO firm’s equity, which serves as a basis for setting the preliminary
offer price. For this purpose, underwriters normally use several valuation methods
and then combine the value estimates of the different methods used in estimating
the fair value of the IPO shares. We know very little about the actual IPO valuation
process used by underwriters because it is unobservable. However, we obtain a
large sample of 228 reports from French underwriters that detail how they value
IPO stocks before the shares start to trade on Euronext Paris. This data is unique
because earnings and cash flow forecasts of U.S. IPO firms are generally unavailable
in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents, and U.S. underwriters
are prohibited from publishing opinions concerning valuation before the IPO
(Kaplan and Ruback 1995; Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2003).1 In our empirical
analyses, we distinguish between five valuation methods: peer group multiples, the
dividend discount model, the discounted cash flow model, the economic value-
added method and underwriter-specific valuation methods. We aim to answer three
novel research questions: (a) How do underwriters select the methods to value IPO
stocks? (b) How do underwriters combine the outcomes of the different valuation
methods to arrive at a fair value estimate of the IPO firms’ equity? (c) How do
underwriters set the preliminary offer price on the basis of the fair value estimate?
This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, we
explain valuation practice in an IPO context. The limited track record at the time of
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     valuation may affect the choice of valuation method. It can thus be expected that
the usefulness of a given valuation model varies with firm-specific factors. It may
also be the case that, depending on aggregate stock market circumstances, the dif-
ferent characteristics of alternative valuation models gives them differing appeal to
underwriters. We therefore examine whether firm-specific factors, aggregate stock
market returns, and aggregate stock market volatility affect the choice of valuation
method. We are aware of only one other study that has investigated the choice of
valuation method by financial analysts. Demirakos, Strong, and Walker (2004)
show that UK analysts tailor their valuation methods to industry circumstances.
However, they do not investigate how firm-specific factors and aggregate stock
market conditions affect the choice of valuation method. Moreover, they anticipate,
but do not test, that analysts may employ different models for dividend payers versus
nonpayers. In this paper, we examine whether the choice of valuation model
depends on the extent to which the IPO firm plans to pay out future dividends.
Our second contribution is that we investigate how underwriters combine the
value estimates of the different valuation methods into their fair value estimate.
Underwriters in our sample frequently use two or more valuation methods, which
implies that they need to assign weights to each of the two or more value estimates
in order to set the fair value estimate. Bayesian theory states that underwriters
should use a linear weighted average of all available bona fide value estimates, giv-
ing a higher weight to the value estimates that they believe to be more accurate
(Yee 2004). Accordingly, Ely and Mande (1996) find that U.S. analysts substitute
away from earnings toward dividends when earnings are noisy indications of
future earnings. Penman (1998) investigates how to combine the equity valuations
of price–earnings and price-to-book multiples into one composite valuation. He
shows that more weight should be given to book value and less to earnings multi-
ples when earnings are particularly high or low relative to book value. We are not
aware of papers that examine how underwriters weigh the value estimates of the
five valuation methods that we examine in this paper.
The third contribution is that we have access to pre-IPO reports that detail how
underwriters value IPOs in practice. This differs from Kim and Ritter 1999, Pur-
nanandam and Swaminathan 2004, and Houston, James, and Karceski 2006, who
only consider the use of multiples valuation and thus have to estimate the value of
IPO firms using their own techniques assuming that the results approximate the
valuation process used by the underwriter. The pre-IPO reports enable us to focus
on the early stage of IPO valuation during which the underwriter uses one or more
valuation methods to arrive at its fair value estimate of the IPO firm’s equity. We
also examine how the underwriter sets the preliminary offer price on the basis of
its fair value estimate. We report that the typical underwriter applies a deliberate
discount to the fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price. The
deliberate price discount is distinct from the well-known IPO underpricing that
occurs later in the IPO pricing process.2 To our knowledge, we are the first to
investigate the cross-sectional determinants of the deliberate price discount.
We document that underwriters widely use peer group multiples to value IPO
shares. However, in contrast to previous U.S. studies (e.g., Asquith, Mikhall, andCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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     Au 2005; Houston et al. 2006) we also find many cases where the dividend dis-
count model and/or the discounted cash flow model is used. Our results show that
underwriters do not randomly select a valuation method, but base their decision on
firm characteristics, aggregate stock market returns, and aggregate stock market
volatility in the period before the IPO. For example, they prefer to use the dividend
discount model to value firms that go public when past aggregate stock market
returns have been poor and when companies plan to pay a large proportion of their
future earnings as dividends. The weight that underwriters assign to the value esti-
mates of the different valuation methods in setting their fair value estimate also
depends on firm-specific factors and aggregate stock market conditions. For
instance, underwriters assign a lower weight to the value estimates of peer group
multiples and discounted cash flow methods when valuing firms that plan to pay a
high proportion of their future earnings as dividends. Instead they attach a higher
weight to the value estimate of the dividend discount model for high-dividend-
paying firms. This suggests that underwriters take into account the firm’s dividend
policy when valuing the IPO firm’s equity. We also report that the average under-
writer discounts the fair value estimate by 18.2 percent to determine the preliminary
offer price. We document that more reputable underwriters offer lower discounts to
investors. Companies forecasted to be relatively profitable in the year of going public
are associated with lower IPO price discounts. In addition, we report that the IPO
price discount is higher for riskier IPO deals with greater valuation uncertainty.
The outline of our paper is as follows. Section 2 positions our paper relative to
the prior literature. In section 3, we develop our empirical model and in section 4
describe the data. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
2. Prior literature
Most valuation studies concentrate on the accuracy of valuation methods. Cheng
and McNamura (2000) and Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2002) focus on multiples
valuation and report that multiples derived from forecast earnings are more accu-
rate than multiples based on other value drivers. Other papers investigate how the
selection of comparable firms affects the accuracy of multiples (e.g., Boatsman
and Baskin 1981; Alford 1992; Baker and Ruback 1999; Bhojrai and Lee 2002). In
general, these authors find that expected profitability, growth, and risk are effective
criteria for selecting comparable firms.
Valuation theorists have studied the theoretical properties of several valuation
frameworks. Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis, Olsson, and Oswald
(2000) compare the accuracy of dividend, free cash flows, and accrual earnings
equity value estimates. They find that the value estimate based on accrual earnings is
more accurate than the value estimates based on free cash flows or dividends.
However, Lundholm and O’Keefe (2001) show that discounted cash flow and
accrual valuation models yield identical valuations when consistently applying the
same input assumptions to the different models.
The multiples valuation and discounted cash flow models also appear to have
similar valuation accuracy. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) show that the discounted
cash flow method performs at least as well as the multiples method in valuingCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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                                                                                                             leveraged buyouts. Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback (2000) report that discounted
cash flow and comparable firm valuation methods have similar accuracy in the
context of bankruptcy court cases.
Kim and Ritter (1999) investigate how the offer prices of U.S. IPO firms are
set by selecting multiples from industry peers that went public no more than 12
months before the IPO firm’s offer date. They report that forward price–earnings
multiples dominate all other multiples in valuation accuracy. Houston et al. (2006)
also focus on multiples valuation and study the accuracy of target prices estab-
lished by analysts 1 month after the IPO and argue that this is informative of how
U.S. underwriters value IPOs. They find that the average offer price is set at a 10
percent discount compared with the value estimate using the mean comparable
firm multiple listed in the analyst report. However, they do not investigate what
determines the size of the discount as we do in this paper.
We conclude that most valuation studies focus on a comparison between the
valuation accuracy of the different methods or on the best way to select compara-
ble companies for multiples valuation. Little is known about what determines the
choice of valuation method. In a recent paper, Demirakos et al. (2004) find that
financial analysts in the United Kingdom are more likely to use multiples valuation
as their dominant valuation method in the beverages industry than in the pharma-
ceutical and electronics industries. They argue that the multiples method is more
applicable to the beverages industry because it is characterized by stable and uniform
growth prospects compared with the pharmaceutical and electronics industries. In
this paper, we examine whether the underwriter selects a specific valuation method
based on firm-specific factors, aggregate stock market returns, and aggregate stock
market volatility when valuing IPO shares in France. This richer set of determi-
nants distinguishes our study from Demirakos et al. 2004. Another difference is
that we examine the determinants of the weights that underwriters assign to the
value estimates of the different methods in order to arrive at a fair value estimate of
the firm’s equity. In the next section, we develop our empirical model.
3. Empirical model
Explaining the choice of valuation method
In this section, we develop an empirical model to explain the choice for a particular
valuation method in the context of IPOs. We examine the cross-sectional determi-
nants of the choice for a particular valuation method using the binary logit analysis.
We estimate the following models:
Model 1 [2, 3, 4, 5]
MULTIi[DDMi, DCFi, EVAi, OTHi]  0  1LnSIZEi  2Ln(1  AGEi)
 3AIPi  4PROFi  5GROWi
 6DIVi  7TECHi  8MRETi
 9SDi  10NMi  11UREPi  i.CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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                                               In the five logit regressions the dependent variable equals one if the underwriter
uses the peer group multiples method (MULT), dividend discount model (DDM),
discounted cash flow model (DCF), economic value-added method (EVA), or
underwriter-specific techniques (OTH), respectively. The multiples valuation is a
relative valuation approach whereas the other four valuation methods are direct
valuation techniques.3 We include the same set of independent variables for every
model. Table 1 shows variable definitions.
We measure firm size (LnSIZE) by the natural logarithm of total assets
reported on the balance sheet of the most recent financial year before going public.
Larger IPO firms are considered to be easier to value than smaller IPO firms
because they have more stable and easier to forecast cash flows and dividends (Ritter
1984; Beatty and Ritter 1986). This makes the use of direct valuation methods such
as the dividend discount model and the discounted cash flow model more likely.
The natural logarithm of one plus firm age (Ln(1  AGE)) is used as an ex ante
proxy for risk. It is argued that the greater the age of the firm, the lower the degree
of risk (Ritter 1984). Kim and Ritter (1999) argue that it is more difficult to forecastTABLE 1
Variable definitions
Dependent variables
MULT dummy variable equal to 1 if the underwriter uses the multiples valuation
DDM dummy variable equal to 1 if the underwriter uses the dividend discount 
model
DCF dummy variable equal to 1 if the underwriter uses the discounted cash flow 
model
EVA dummy variable equal to 1 if the underwriter uses the economic value-added 
method
OTH dummy variable equal to 1 if the underwriter uses underwriter-specific 
valuation methods
MULTW weight the underwriter assigns to the value estimate of multiples valuation 
when setting the fair value estimate
DDMW weight the underwriter assigns to the value estimate of the dividend discount 
model when setting the fair value estimate
DCFW weight the underwriter assigns to the value estimate of the discounted cash 
flow model when setting the fair value estimate
EVAW weight the underwriter assigns to the value estimate of the economic value-
added method when setting the fair value estimate
OTHW weight the underwriter assigns to the value estimate of underwriter-specific 
valuation methods when setting the fair value estimate
DISCOUNT (fair value estimate  preliminary offer value)/preliminary offer value
(The table is continued on the next page.)
Variable
name DescriptionCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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                                   future cash flows and dividends for younger firms without established track
records because more of their value is represented by expectations about future
growth rates, which can substantially vary from firm to firm. We therefore predict
that older firms are more likely to be valued using direct valuation methods.
We measure assets in place (AIP) as the ratio of plant, property, and equip-
ment and total assets at the end of the financial year preceding the IPO. In general,
accounting numbers are believed to be better in capturing the value derived from
tangible assets than intangible assets (Lev 2001). This predicts an increased use of
accounting-based valuation methods such as the economic value-added method
when valuing firms with high asset tangibility.TABLE 1 (Continued)
Independent variables
LnSIZE natural logarithm of assets (in millions €) for the most recent 12-month 
financial period reported in the prospectus
Ln(1  AGE) natural logarithm of (one plus firm age). Firm age is the difference between 
the IPO year and the founding year in the prospectus
AIP plant, property, and equipment from the most recent 12-month balance sheet 
disclosed in the prospectus divided by total assets
PROF ratio of current year’s forecasted earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
to current year’s forecasted sales
GROW forecasted sales growth during the current year
DIV future dividend payout ratio (dividends/net income) as disclosed in the 
prospectus
TECH dummy variable equal to 1 if a company belongs to the technology sector 
(using Loughran and Ritter 2004 definition), and 0 otherwise
MRET market index return during a 90-trading-day interval from 95 trading days 
before to 5 trading days before the IPO firm’s first day of trading. We use the 
Datastream index for France prior to 1992 and the MSCI France index 
thereafter
SD standard deviation of the daily market index returns during a 90-trading-day 
interval from 95 trading days before to 5 trading days before the IPO firm’s 
first day of trading. We use the Datastream index for France prior to 1992 
and the MSCI France index thereafter
NM dummy variable equal to 1 if a company goes public on the Nouveau 
Marché, and 0 otherwise
UREP percentage market share of the IPO lead underwriter in the French IPO 
market (measured by gross proceeds raised during 1990–99)
UNCERT coefficient of variation (standard deviation/average) of the valuation 
estimates of the different valuation methods used by the underwriter. If the 
underwriter only uses one valuation method valuation, this variable is set 
equal to 0 (in 30 cases)
Variable
name DescriptionCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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        We hypothesize that underwriters are more likely to value the IPO firm using
peer group multiples when they forecast that the company is comparatively profit-
able in the current year (PROF). When firms are forecasted to be only marginally
profitable or loss-reporting, it is less appropriate to use multiples valuation because
applying price–earnings multiples in these circumstances would result in a low or
negative multiples valuation.
We employ forecasted sales growth during the current year (GROW ) as our
proxy for growth opportunities. For rapidly growing firms short-term free cash
flows tend to be negative because the cash inflows are lower than capital invest-
ments. As argued by Penman 2001 (117), investment is treated as a loss of value in
the discounted cash flow method, and free cash flow fails to recognize value that
does not involve cash flows. In addition, growing firms tend to retain their earnings
rather than pay them out as dividends. Multiples valuation is better suited to value
rapidly growing firms because it values investments and growth opportunities. We
thus hypothesize that rapidly growing firms are less likely to be valued using the
direct valuation methods but more likely to be valued using the multiples
approach.
A unique feature of our data is that French IPO firms typically disclose their
future dividend payout ratio (DIV ) in their prospectuses. Firms that make a com-
mitment to pay out a high dividend can be regarded as entering into an ex ante
implicit contract that is verifiable in the period following the IPO. Bhattacharya
(1979) shows that only high-quality firms can credibly use dividend payout to signal
their quality to investors. In his theoretical model, dividends are an immediately
costly and easily observable signal that low-quality firms are unable to imitate
without turning to expensive outside financing. A commitment to a high and stable
dividend payout ratio (DIV ) can therefore be expected to make the value estimate
of the dividend discount model more reliable. In particular, it enables the under-
writer to more reliably forecast dividends over a longer planning horizon making
the value estimate less dependent on the terminal value calculation. Damodaran
(1994, 121) writes that many financial analysts view the dividend discount as use-
ful for valuing stable, high-dividend-paying stocks. We therefore predict that
underwriters are more likely to use the dividend discount model when setting the
fair value estimate for firms that plan to pay out a large proportion of their future
earnings as dividends.
High-tech firms are more difficult to value because a large part of their value is
derived from growth options (Kim and Ritter 1999; Bartov, Mohanram, and
Seethamraju 2002). Because direct valuation methods such as the discounted cash
flow method and the dividend discount model cannot easily incorporate the value of
these growth opportunities we expect that technology companies are more likely to
be valued using the multiples approach. We therefore include a dummy variable
(TECH) that equals 1 if the IPO firm is a high-tech company and 0 otherwise.4
Value estimates generated by the discounted cash flow model are sensitive to
the cash flow and discount rate assumptions of underwriters. Although discounted
cash flow valuation may be useful in assessing equity values to a given issuer,
DeAngelo (1990) argues that it is not a very credible means of convincing outsideCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
1224 Contemporary Accounting Researchstockholders because of the sensitivity of the value estimate to the assumptions
made unless there is a window of opportunity in which investors are more eager to
buy stocks. A rising aggregate stock market may indicate such a window of oppor-
tunity. We thus include in our model market index returns (MRET) during a
90-trading-day interval from 95 trading days before and 5 trading days before the
IPO firm’s first day of trading. We predict that a period with high aggregate stock
market returns before the IPO increases the likelihood of using the discounted cash
flow model. In contrast, we expect that the dividend discount model is more often
used when aggregate stock market returns are poor. Baker and Wurgler (2004)
develop a theory in which firms pay dividends to cater to investor demand. When
the aggregate stock market is declining, investors may be more likely to look for
safe dividend-paying stocks that give them interim payments on their investment
(rather than having to sell their stock in a declining market). This may give the div-
idend discount model more appeal when aggregate stock market returns are low
because it emphasizes the firm’s dividend-paying ability.
We also include the standard deviation of the daily market index returns (SD)
during a 90-trading-day interval from 95 trading days before and 5 trading days
before the IPO firm’s first day of trading in our model. We argue that investors are
likely to be more uncertain about fundamental value when the aggregate stock
market is volatile. Underwriters may then cater to the investor’s demand for more
information about fundamental value by valuing the IPO stock using direct valuation
methods. We therefore expect that direct valuation methods such as the dividend
discount model, the discounted cash flow model, and the economic value-added
method to be used more often when the aggregate stock market is more volatile in
the period before the IPO.
We include two control variables in our empirical model. In order to increase
the power of our tests, we decide to pool the observations for the Nouveau Marché
and Second Marché of Euronext Paris in our analyses. We include a Nouveau
Marché dummy variable (NM) to control for any potential differences in the choice
of valuation method between the two markets. In France, IPO activity is concen-
trated on these two stock market segments. The Nouveau Marché was established
in 1996 to attract young and high-tech issuers. Companies that want to list on this
stock market are required to have a book value of equity equal to €1.5 million and
to raise a minimum of €5 million in the IPO. At least half of the shares sold in the
IPO must be newly issued by the company. In addition, Nouveau Marché IPO
firms are required to have a free float equal to at least 20 percent of the shares out-
standing after the IPO. The Second Marché was founded in 1983 to attract small
family-run businesses in more mature industries. Firms that go public on this stock
market have to have been in existence for at least two years and have a free float of
at least 10 percent of the shares outstanding after the IPO.
We also include underwriter reputation as a control variable. We use under-
writer market share as our proxy for underwriter reputation (UREP). We calculate
the underwriter market share as the percentage market share of the lead underwriter.
Following Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2002, market share is the sum of gross proceeds
(excluding overallotment option) in all IPOs lead managed by the underwriter,CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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underwriters are believed to be experts in valuing companies (Carter and Manaster
1990). This may have an impact on valuation method choice although we do not
have any specific a priori predictions about which valuation method would be pre-
ferred by higher reputation underwriters.
Explaining the weights attached to valuation estimates
We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to explain the weight that
underwriters assign to the value estimate of a particular valuation method condi-
tional on the underwriter using that method. The dependent variable is defined as
the weight attached to the value estimates of the multiples valuation method
(MULTW ), dividend discount model (DDMW ), discounted cash flow model
(DCFW), economic value-added method (EVAW), and underwriter-specific tech-
niques (OTHW) in setting the fair value estimate, respectively. The weights are
obtained from the valuation reports published by the underwriter before the IPO
starts trading on the stock market. For example, one underwriter in our sample
arrives at a fair value estimate of €151.7 million by assigning a weight of 2/3 to
the multiples value estimate of €154.1 million and a weight of 1 / 3 to the dis-
counted cash flow value estimate of €147 million. In this example, MULTW thus
equals 2/3 and DCFW equals 1/3. We include the same set of independent vari-
ables as in the logit regressions. The models are as follows:
Model 6 [7, 8, 9, 10]
MULTWi[DDMWi, DCFWi, EVAWi, OTHWi]  0  1LnSIZEi
 2Ln(1  AGEi)  3AIPi
 4PROFi  5GROWi
 6DIVi  7TECHi
 8MRETi  9SDi
 10NMi  11UREPi  i.
Bayesian theory suggests that analysts should use a weighted linear combina-
tion of all available bona fide value estimates with higher weights assigned to those
value estimates that are believed to be more reliable (Yee 2004). We therefore
expect underwriters to assign a higher weight to the value estimates of direct valu-
ation methods when they believe that these methods are more likely to generate
reliable value estimates. As argued before, direct valuation methods are believed to
be more appropriate when valuing larger and older firms with low growth opportu-
nities from mature industries. We predict that underwriters will attach a higher
weight to the valuation estimate of the multiples approach when valuing relatively
profitable, rapidly growing, and / or technology firms for which this method is
likely to be more suitable. Assuming that accounting numbers are better able to
capture value generated from tangible assets than intangible assets, we predict that
the economic value-added method receives a higher weight in the fair value esti-
mate when valuing firms with more assets in place (AIP).CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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payout ratio (DIV) is expected to make the value estimate of the dividend discount
model more reliable. The underwriter is able to more reliably forecast dividends
over a longer planning period. This reduces the sensitivity of the value estimate to
the terminal value calculation. We thus predict that underwriters assign a higher
weight to the value estimate of the dividend discount model when setting the fair
value estimate for firms that plan to pay out a high proportion of their future earn-
ings as dividends.
We anticipate that aggregate stock market returns have a positive impact on
the weight assigned to the value estimate of the discounted cash flow model. When
market index returns (MRET) are high, there is a window of opportunity during
which investors are more likely to believe the cash flow and discount rate assump-
tions underlying the discounted cash flow model (DeAngelo 1990). In a period
with low aggregate stock market returns, investors may be more interested in buy-
ing safe dividend-paying stocks. In this event, investors prefer interim payments
rather than relying on future capital gains to generate a return on their investment.
Underwriters are expected to assign a higher weight to the dividend discount
model in the fair value estimate in this event so as to emphasize the dividend-paying
capacity of the IPO firm and to possibly cater to investor demand for dividends.
We expect that underwriters are more likely to rely on value estimates from
direct valuation methods, such as the discounted dividend model and discounted
cash flow model, during periods when investors are uncertain about the fundamental
value of stocks. A period with high aggregate market volatility may indicate such a
period. We therefore expect underwriters to assign higher weights to the value esti-
mates of the direct valuation methods when the standard deviation of the market
index returns (SD) is high in the period before the IPO. As before, the Nouveau
Marché dummy (NM) and the underwriter reputation (UREP) act as control variables.
Explaining the price discount
As a final part of our analysis, we estimate an OLS regression to explain the IPO
price discount. After determining the fair value estimate, the typical underwriter
applies a price discount to set the preliminary offer price. The discount (DISCOUNT)
is computed as (fair value estimate  preliminary offer value)/fair value estimate.
In this expression, the preliminary offer value is computed as the preliminary offer
price times the number of shares outstanding after the IPO. The model is as follows:
Model 11
DISCOUNTi  0  1LnSIZEi  2Ln(1  AGEi)  3AIPi  4PROFi
 5GROWi  6DIVi  7TECHi  8MRETi  9SDi
 10NMi  11UREPi  12UNCERTi  i.
McCarthy (1999) argues that applying a price discount early on in the IPO valu-
ation process may serve two purposes. First, it permits underwriters to expend less
market effort and to ingratiate themselves with buy-side clients such as institutionalCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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tors argue that the issue was overpriced, the underwriter can point to this discount
as evidence of conservative pricing (Tiniç 1988).
The information asymmetry theories of Beatty and Ritter 1986 and Baron 1982
argue that IPOs characterized by greater valuation uncertainty will need larger
price discounts. In their theoretical models, the price discounts serve to compensate
investors for the valuation uncertainty associated with risky IPO deals. We therefore
expect higher discounts when underwriters bring smaller, younger, less profitable,
rapidly growing, and/or technology firms with low asset tangibility to the market.
We also add a more direct measure of valuation uncertainty (UNCERT ) to the
regression model. This variable is measured as the ratio of standard deviation of
the different valuation estimates and the arithmetic average of the valuation estimates.
In 30 cases, the underwriter only uses one valuation method and we set this variable
equal to 0. We predict higher price discounts when valuation uncertainty is greater.
As mentioned earlier, Bhattacharya (1979) theoretically shows that high-quality
companies signal their quality by committing themselves to a high dividend payout.
Low-quality companies cannot credibly mimic this signal without turning to
expensive outside financing again. If investors consider the future dividend payout
policy announced in the prospectus as credible, this commitment to a high future
dividend payout ratio (DIV ) can be expected to reduce the need for high price
discounts.
Market conditions may be another important determinant of the deliberate
price discounts. If market returns (MRET) are low and/or market volatility (SD) is
high, underwriters may need to attract investors through larger discounts and/or avoid
accusations of overpricing from investors. We also expect that more reputable under-
writers offer lower discounts to investors. Their reputation capital certifies IPO firm
quality and reduces the need to compensate investors by means of price discounts
(Carter and Manaster 1990). The Nouveau Marché dummy variable (NM ) is
included to control for any differences in price discounts between the two markets.
4. Data and sample description
Sample construction
We start with the complete universe of French newly listed firms from January
1990 to December 1999. New listings are identified by L’Année Boursière, an
annual publication of the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF), the SDC New
Issues Database, and Dealogic. We exclude 24 firms that are listed on the Premier
Marché (the most prestigious listing venue in France) because these listings
generally involve privatization, equity carveouts, or spinoffs. The 29 firms that
transferred from the Marché hors-cote (an over-the-counter market that existed
until 1998) or that previously traded on a foreign stock market are excluded
because their price discovery is straightforward. We exclude 26 financial services
firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) because their reporting environments are different
from those of other IPO firms. For the same reason, 18 firms that listed either on
one of the six regional stock exchanges (Bordeaux, Lille, Lyons, Marseilles,CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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France) are removed.
These selection criteria (set out in Table 2) result in a sample of 309 non-
financial French firms that had an IPO on either the Nouveau Marché (98 firms) or
the Second Marché (211 firms) of Euronext Paris. We obtain valuation reports
from the company, from the lead underwriter, from the Commission des Opération
de Bourse (COB — the French equivalent of the SEC), or from Disclosure Global
Access for 228 out of 309 companies. We obtain 66 valuation reports for the Nou-
veau Marché and 162 reports for the Second Marché. The valuation reports are
from 34 different underwriters.
Descriptive statistics
We first examine the industry distribution for our sample of 228 IPO firms (not tab-
ulated). We group our firms into industries using the industry classifications from
Fama and French 1997, which are constructed by grouping various four-digit SIC
codes. Many different Fama-French industries are represented in our sample of
which business services (22.8 percent), wholesale trade (9.2 percent), and retail
(5.7 percent) dominate. We observe that 22.8 percent of our sample firms are active
in the technology sector.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics. Offer prices and financial statement
numbers are taken from IPO prospectuses. We collect information about total assets
from the balance sheet ending one financial year before the IPO (SIZE). Table 3
shows the average (median) SIZE equals €54.2 million (€20.9 million). We measure
company age (AGE) as the number of years the firm has been in existence prior to
its IPO. We find that the average (median) AGE equals 27.4 years (16 years).CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
TABLE 2
Sample selection criteria
1990 16 0 0 7 4 0 5
1991 14 2 0 6 3 0 3
1992 6 1 0 1 2 2 0
1993 9 0 0 2 0 0 7
1994 36 3 1 3 3 4 22
1995 21 3 4 1 0 1 12
1996 52 4 3 2 1 17 25
1997 66 2 7 2 2 16 37
1998 119 5 9 1 1 24 79
1999 67 4 5 1 2 17 38
Total 406 24 29 26 18 81 228
Exclusions because of
Year
New 
admissions
Premier 
Marché Transfers
Financial 
services
Regional 
exchange
No 
valuation 
report
In 
sample
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1230 Contemporary Accounting ResearchTable 3 also reports on assets in place (AIP). The average [median] company
in our sample has 17.9 percent (13.4 percent) of its asset base in plant, property,
and equipment in the financial year before the IPO. Profitability (PROF) is defined
as the current year’s forecast earnings before interest and taxes divided by current
year’s forecasted sales. The average (median) PROF equals 11 percent (10.5 per-
cent). Next, we examine forecasted sales growth (GROW) during the current year.
The average (median) company in our sample is forecasted to experience a sales
growth of 31 percent (21.4 percent). We find that the average [median] future divi-
dend payout ratio (DIV) equals 20 percent (20 percent) of net income.
The market index return (MRET) is measured during a 90-trading-day interval
from 95 trading days before and 5 trading days before the IPO firm’s first day of
trading. We use the Datastream index for France prior to 1992 and the MSCI
France index thereafter. The average (median) MRET is 9.23 percent (9.46 per-
cent). The market index volatility (SD) is measured as the standard deviation of the
daily market index returns during the same 90-trading-day interval. The average
(median) SD equals 1.13 percent (1.03 percent). We calculate the underwriter market
share as the percentage market share of the lead underwriter as our proxy for
underwriter reputation (UREP).6 The average (median) UREP is 2.6 percent (0.3
percent).
The average (median) number of different valuation methods (NMETHODS)
used by the underwriter equals 2.4 (2). Multiples valuation is the most popular with
199 underwriters using this method. The dividend discount model and discounted
cash flow model are each used by 135 underwriters. The use of the economic value
added is not as widespread with 44 underwriters employing this method. Under-
writers rarely base fair value estimates on underwriter-specific valuation techniques
such as discounting sales, discounting earnings, sum-of-the-parts valuation, etc.
These underwriter-specific techniques are used in 26 valuation reports.
A unique aspect of our data is that we are also able to determine the weights
that underwriters assign to the value estimates of the different models when arrivingTABLE 3 (Continued)
Note:
The sample consists of 228 IPO firms from January 1990 to December 1999. The number of 
different valuation methods (NMETHOD) that the underwriter uses to value the IPO 
firm’s equity is taken from the valuation report. The fair value estimate (FAIRV) can 
be viewed as an ex ante estimate of the “true” or market value of the IPO and is taken 
from the valuation report that is published about two weeks before the shares start 
trading on the stock market. Preliminary offer value (POFFERV) is computed as the 
number of shares outstanding after the IPO times the preliminary offer price. The 
preliminary offer price equals the mid-point of the price range for 128 IPOs that use 
the book-building procedure. The preliminary offer price is set equal to the minimum 
tender price for 81 IPO auctions. The preliminary price equals the fixed-offer price 
for 19 fixed-price offerings. The first market price is retrieved from Datastream. 
Other variables are as defined in Table 1.CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
How Do Underwriters Value Initial Public Offerings? 1231at their fair value estimate. Table 3 shows the weights assigned to the value esti-
mate of each method in the fair value estimate conditional on the underwriter using
that method. For this reason, the average weights do not add up to 100 percent.7
The average (median) weight assigned to the multiples value estimate (MULTW)
in the fair value estimate equals 50.3 percent (50 percent).8 When underwriters use
the dividend discount model they assign an average (median) weight (DDMW ) of
40.4 percent (33.3 percent). The discounted cash flow value estimate receives an
average (median) weight (DCFW ) of 36.8 percent (33.3 percent). The average
(median) weight (EVAW ) attached to the economic value-added value estimate
amounts to 30.2 percent (25 percent). The average (median) value estimate of the
underwriter-specific techniques is weighted at 40.1 percent (33.3 percent)
(OTHW ). The different valuation methods may yield diverging value estimates
indicating valuation uncertainty. The average (median) valuation uncertainty
(UNCERT) equals 10.5 percent (7.9 percent).
To complete the picture, Table 3 also shows the statistical properties of the fair
value of the IPO firm’s equity (FAIRV). The average (median) FAIRV in our sample
equals €69.5 million (€41 million). After the underwriter has determined the fair
value estimate, he or she applies the deliberate price discount to come to the pre-
liminary offer value (POFFERV ). The average (median) POFFERV, computed as
the preliminary offer price times the number of shares outstanding after comple-
tion of the IPO, equals €57.5 million (€33.3 million). Finally, the average (median)
deliberate price discount (DISCOUNT) is 18.2 percent (18.2 percent).
5. Empirical results
The choice of valuation method
Table 4 shows the results of the binary logit analyses. Consistent with expecta-
tions, we find that underwriters are more likely to use the multiples method when
the firm is forecasted to be relatively profitable in the current year (PROF). We also
find that technology firms (TECH) and rapidly growing firms (GROW ) are more
likely to be valued using multiples valuation. We infer that the value of technology
and high-growth companies is derived from growth opportunities that are more
easily valued using multiples valuation. More reputable underwriters (UREP) are
more likely to opt for multiples valuation.
Table 4 shows that underwriters have a preference for the dividend discount
model when the firm is older (Ln(1  AGE)) and intends to pay out a large fraction
of its future earnings as dividends (DIV ). Other things being equal, underwriters
valuing Nouveau Marché IPO firms (NM) and technology companies (TECH) are
less likely to employ the dividend discount model. Underwriters are also less likely
to use the dividend discount model when valuing companies that are relatively profit-
able (PROF). When market returns (MRET) are low it becomes more likely that the
underwriter will use the dividend discount model to value the IPO firm’s equity. A
possible explanation is that investors are more interested in safe dividend-paying
stocks when aggregate stock market returns are low. The negative coefficient on
aggregate stock market volatility (SD) is inconsistent with our expectations andCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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TABLE 4
Determinants of the use of valuation method
LnSIZE 0.063 0.157 0.137 0.276 0.300
(0.214) (0.922) (0.725) (1.447) (1.125)
Ln(1  AGE) 0.231 0.342 0.102 0.380 0.470
(0.675) (1.742)‡ (0.377) (1.441) (1.435)
AIP 0.319 0.313 0.050 1.850 0.020
(0.270) (0.324) (0.043) (1.287) (0.015)
PROF 5.105 3.110 2.472 0.178 0.678
(1.982)‡ (1.792)‡ (0.993) (0.064) (0.277)
GROW 0.022 0.300 0.077 0.647 0.497
(1.713)‡ (0.418) (0.146) (0.922) (0.873)
DIV 0.043 5.537 0.285 0.295 2.300
(0.020) (3.473)* (0.193) (0.202) (1.314)
TECH 1.366 0.273 0.273 0.591 1.248
(2.057)† (1.867)‡ (0.511) (1.239) (1.644)
MRET 0.696 4.758 6.015 2.768 0.986
(0.438) (4.044)* (4.432)* (2.132)† (0.719)
SD 65.866 141.276 385.462 219.065 22.918
(0.937) (2.809)* (5.011)* (3.898)* (0.337)
NM 0.940 1.205 0.939 0.644 0.817
(1.491) (2.411)† (1.680)‡ (1.259) (1.285)
UREP 17.941 3.180 1.606 5.320 3.127
(2.161)† (0.769) (0.320) (0.941) (0.553)
Intercept 0.804 2.946 3.183 2.279 4.114
(0.224) (1.613) (1.335) (1.025) (1.370)
McFadden R2 13.613 25.559 29.016 14.931 6.617
LR-statistic 23.651† 78.797* 89.455* 33.397* 10.708
n 228 228 228 228 228
Notes:
Table shows the results of binary logit analyses. The z-statistics are in parentheses and are 
based on robust Huber-White standard errors.
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
† Significant at the 5 percent level.
‡ Significant at the 10 percent level.
The variables are as defined in Table 1.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent 
variable MULT DDM DCF EVA OTH
How Do Underwriters Value Initial Public Offerings? 1233suggests that underwriters are less, rather than more, likely to use the dividend dis-
count model in the face of a volatile stock market. We also do not find support for
our conjecture that underwriters are more likely to use the dividend discount model
to value large firms (LnSIZE) and firms with relatively low forecasted sales growth
(GROW).
Underwriters prefer to use the discounted cash flow method when valuing
Nouveau Marché companies (NM). One possible explanation is that the discounted
cash flow analysis is used to value Nouveau Marché firms because the other valuation
methods are difficult to employ. Typically, these companies cannot be valued using
the dividend discount model because they do not pay dividends in the immediate
future, and it is more difficult to find comparable companies to use for multiples
valuation.9 We also find that underwriters use discounted cash flow analysis when
the market index returns (MRET) are high. We conjecture that these market condi-
tions offer a window of opportunity during which investors are more eager to buy
stocks and more willing to believe the cash flow and discount rate assumptions
underlying the discounted cash flow model. We report that the market index vola-
tility (SD) is positively related to the use of the discounted cash flow model. In
these market circumstances, investors may be more uncertain about fundamental
value. The discounted cash flow model may give investors the information they
need to evaluate the fundamental value of the IPO stock. In contrast to our predic-
tions, we do not find that underwriters use the discounted cash flow model more
frequently when valuing larger (LnSIZE), older companies (Ln(1  AGE)) with
lower growth rates (GROW).
We report that aggregate market conditions are an important determinant of
the choice for the economic value-added method. The use of the economic value-
added method is more frequent when aggregate market returns (MRET) are high.
Similar to the discounted cash flow model, we argue that investors are more recep-
tive to this valuation method in a buoyant stock market. The economic value-added
method is also more often used when the overall market is relatively volatile (SD).
We infer that the additional information disclosed to investors as part of the
economic value-added method may give investors the information about the fun-
damental value of the IPO firms that they are looking for. Apart from aggregate
market conditions, we do not find any determinants of the choice for this valuation
method. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a higher use of economic
value-added method when valuing firms with more assets in place (AIP).
Finally, we examine the use of underwriter-specific methods. We do not find
any statistically significant determinants that explain the choice for this particular
valuation method. Possibly, there is too much heterogeneity among the underwriter-
specific methods.
Weights attached to value estimates
Table 5 shows the results of the valuation weights regressions. These regressions
are estimated conditional on the underwriter using that particular method to value the
IPO firm’s equity. The first column shows that the weight attached to the multiples
valuation outcome is 3.4 percentage points higher for technology companies (TECH).CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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1236 Contemporary Accounting ResearchUnderwriters also rely on this method to a larger extent when valuing relatively
profitable (PROF ) and / or fast-growing (GROW ) firms. Underwriters are less
likely to rely on the multiples valuation outcome when the company plans to pay
out a relatively high fraction of its future earnings as dividends (DIV ) and when
the stock market is more volatile (SD).
Consistent with expectations, underwriters base their fair value estimate on
the dividend discount model to a higher degree when the company is planning to
pay out a higher proportion of its future earnings as dividends (DIV). The dividend
discount model carries more weight when market index returns (MRET) are poor.
A possible explanation is that underwriters cater to investor demand and underline
the dividend-paying ability of the IPO stock at a time when investors are generally
more interested in dividends. We report that the weight assigned to the dividend
discount model is higher when the aggregate market volatility (SD) is low. This
contrasts with our hypothesis that direct valuation methods are more relied on during
periods of aggregate market volatility. We also do not find support for our conjec-
ture that underwriters rely on the dividend discount model to value large firms
(LnSIZE) and firms with relatively low forecasted sales growth (GROW).
Table 5 reports that underwriters put less weight on the discounted cash flow
method when the company plans to pay out a substantial proportion of its future
earnings as dividends (DIV ). We do not find any other significant determinants of
the weight that underwriters attach to the value estimate of the discounted cash
flow model when setting their fair value estimates. In contrast to our earlier pre-
dictions, there is no support for the conjecture that underwriters rely more on the
discounted cash flow method when valuing older companies (Ln(1  AGE)) with
lower growth rates (GROW ). Market conditions do not seem to influence the
weight that underwriters assign to the discounted cash flow value estimate in set-
ting the fair value estimate.
We do not find any statistically significant determinants of the weight assigned
to the value estimate of the economic value-added method. As a final point, the
weight given to the value estimate of the underwriter-specific techniques is largely
driven by profitability (PROF), underwriter reputation (UREP), and aggregate
stock market volatility (SD). Other things being equal, underwriters do not heavily
rely on these ad hoc techniques when valuing firms with higher forecasted profit-
ability in the current year or when facing a volatile stock market. More reputable
underwriters appear to rely less on these techniques when determining their fair
value estimate. However, we need to be careful in interpreting these results given
the small number of observations.
The price discount
Table 5 shows the results of the deliberate price discount regression model 11. We
find that higher underwriter reputation (UREP) is associated with a lower price dis-
count. This suggests that the underwriter’s reputation capital certifies IPO firm
quality and reduces the need for a high price discount. Other things being equal,
companies that are forecasted to be comparatively profitable in the current year
(PROF) are associated with lower IPO price discounts. Consistent with informationCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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associated with the IPO price discount. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the discount serves as compensation to investors to invest in riskier IPO deals.
Higher aggregate stock market index volatility (SD) has the same effect on the IPO
price discount. In contrast to our expectations, there is no evidence that underwriters
need to attract investors by means of larger discounts when they bring smaller
(LnSIZE), younger (Ln(1  AGE)), technology (TECH), and/or rapidly growing
firms (GROW) to the market. There is also no support for the conjecture that a high
future dividend payout (DIV) is associated with a lower discount or that lower market
returns (MRET) are associated with a higher discount.
Sensitivity analyses
We conduct several unreported sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our
results.10 First, we check whether underwriter familiarity with valuation methods
affects our results. It might be that a particular underwriter always uses the same
methods to value the shares of the companies it brings public. We therefore reesti-
mate models 1 to 5 using a set of 16 dummies for the most active underwriters.
There are at most seven dummies that are significant, suggesting that familiarity
plays some role in explaining the choice for a particular valuation method. How-
ever, our previous results remain largely intact. We also exclude the two underwriters
that make most frequent use, and the two underwriters that make least frequent
use, of a particular valuation method. When reestimating the regressions, the
results prove qualitatively similar.
We also included profitability and sales growth for the year prior to the IPO
rather than the profitability and sales growth forecasted for the current year in the
regressions. Similar results obtain. Our results are also not sensitive to the inclu-
sion of a set of year dummies.
We also tested for possible multicollinearity, which would prevent estimating
discrete effects. We therefore calculate variance inflation factors of the independent
variables (VIFs). VIFs in excess of 10 suggest severe multicollinearity problems.
However, none of the VIFs is higher than 5. This implies that multicollinearity is
not a significant problem in our analyses. In our analyses we pool the observations
for the Nouveau Marché and Second Marché of Euronext Paris to increase the
power of our tests. To some extent, we control for differences between the stock
markets by the inclusion of the Nouveau Marché intercept dummy in our regres-
sion models. As a robustness check, however, we also reestimate all regressions
(with the exception of models 9 and 10 given the limited number of observations)
using interaction terms between the Nouveau Marché dummy variable and all
other independent variables. We find that in an individual regression model there
are never more than two of these interaction terms that are significant. Other things
being equal, Nouveau Marché firms are less likely to be valued using multiples
when their tangible asset intensity (AIP) is high and more likely to be valued using
the discounted dividend model and discounted cash flow model when they are
more profitable (PROF). More reputable underwriters (UREP) are more likely to
value Nouveau Marché firms using the discounted cash flow model. In addition,CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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Nouveau Marché firms and a higher weight on the value estimate of the dividend
discount model when valuing more profitable Nouveau Marché companies. Our
other results are the same as before. Overall, there do not seem to be many differ-
ences in the regression coefficients between the Nouveau Marché and Second
Marché subsamples.
Other possible concerns are with the estimation of models 6 to 10. There are
30 out of 228 valuation reports where the underwriter uses only one particular
method to value the IPO stock. This may influence our results because we give a
weight equal to 100 percent to this one valuation method. We therefore reestimate
models 6 to 10 excluding the 30 observations where the underwriter only uses one
method. We find similar results. Another concern is that the potential weight that
underwriters can assign to the outcome of the value estimate of each method is
inversely related to the number of methods used to value the IPO. To check this,
we also reestimated models 6 to 10, adjusting the weight that the underwriter
assigns to the value estimate of the particular valuation method by subtracting the
inverse of the number of valuation methods that the underwriter uses. Hence, if the
underwriter assigns a weight of 2/3 to the multiples method and he or she uses two
valuation methods, the adjusted weight becomes (2/3  1/2)  1/6. We find similar
results as before when we reestimate the models using the adjusted weights as
dependent variables.
Finally, we test for endogeneity of the price discount to valuation uncertainty
in model 11 using the Davidson-MacKinnon test.11 We find that the test statistic is
not significant (p-value  0.92). The test for endogeneity of price discount to
underwriter reputation is also insignificant (p-value  0.18). Valuation uncertainty
and underwriter reputation can therefore be treated as exogenous variables in the
price discount regression as we do in model 11.
6. Summary and conclusions
The valuation literature is particularly thin about how underwriters value the shares
of the companies they bring public. Our study aims to fill the gap. We obtain valu-
ation reports from underwriters that give us unique access to detailed valuation
analyses for a sample of 228 IPOs on Euronext Paris during the period 1990–99.
We try to answer three new research questions: (a) How do underwriters select the
methods to value IPO stocks? (b) How do underwriters combine the outcomes of
the different valuation methods to arrive at a fair value estimate of the IPO firms’
equity? (c) How do underwriters set the preliminary offer price on the basis of the
fair value estimate?
We document that underwriters frequently use multiples valuation, the divi-
dend discount model, and the discounted cash flow model to value IPO firm’s
equity. Other methods such as the economic value-added method and underwriter-
specific techniques are less widespread. We find that underwriters prefer to use
multiples valuation when valuing technology firms and rapidly growing and /or
profitable firms. The dividend discount model is often used when valuing older
firms from mature industries that plan to pay out a large fraction of their futureCAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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aggregate stock market returns are relatively low. In these market circumstances,
using the dividend discount model may cater to investor demand for safe dividend-
paying stocks. Other things being equal, the use of the discounted cash flow model
and the economic value-added method is more frequent when aggregate stock
market returns are high. A possible explanation is that these stock market condi-
tions offer a window of opportunity during which investors are eager to buy stocks
and more willing to believe assumptions underlying the discounted cash flow
model and the economic value-added method. We also report a higher use of these
two methods when the aggregate stock market is relatively volatile. Investors that
face a more volatile stock market are in need of information about fundamental
value. The discounted cash flow model and economic value-added method may
perhaps provide investors with this information at the time they need it most.
We also investigate the weights that underwriters assign to the value estimates
of the different methods when setting the fair value estimate. The fair value estimate
can be viewed as the underwriter’s ex ante estimate of first-day market capitalization.
Underwriters assign a higher weight to the value estimate of the multiples method
when valuing relatively profitable and/or fast-growing firms in the technology sector.
The multiples value estimate and the discounted cash flow value estimate receive
lower weights when the company plans to pay out relatively high dividends in the
future. Underwriters assign a higher weight to the value estimate of the dividend
discount model when the IPO firm plans to pay out a larger fraction of its future
earnings as dividends. Possibly, underwriters believe the dividend discount model
to be more reliable in case the firm plans to pay out more dividends in the future.
Other things being equal, underwriters do not heavily rely on ad hoc underwriter-
specific techniques when valuing more profitable firms or when facing a more vola-
tile aggregate stock market. More reputable underwriters seem to rely less on their
underwriter-specific value estimates when determining their fair value estimate.
As a final point, we investigate the determinants of the price discount that
underwriters apply to their fair value estimate to arrive at the preliminary offer
value. This discount is thus applied early on in the IPO valuation process and is
distinct from the well-documented IPO underpricing. We document that more rep-
utable underwriters are associated with lower discounts. Other things being equal,
companies that are forecasted to be comparatively profitable in the current year are
also linked with lower price discounts. In addition, we report that the price dis-
count is larger for riskier IPO deals with higher valuation uncertainty.
To conclude, this study extends the findings of Demirakos et al. 2004 by look-
ing at the use of the valuation method in the context of IPOs and including a richer
set of determinants in our empirical model. This enables us to go beyond looking
at the cross-industry variation in the use of particular valuation models. We report
that firm characteristics, aggregate stock returns, and aggregate stock market vola-
tility are important determinants of the choice of valuation method. Underwriters
therefore do not seem to select the valuation methods at random but to at least par-
tially base their decisions on industry circumstances, firm-specific factors, and
aggregate stock market conditions.CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
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accuracy of different valuation methods or on the best way to select comparable
companies for multiples valuation. There is a paucity of research about the deter-
minants of valuation method choice. Future studies could conduct a large survey
among financial analysts to shed more light on why and when they use a particular
valuation method. Another suggestion for future research is to investigate whether
using several valuation methods is associated with higher valuation accuracy.
Finally, the use of valuation methods in other contexts such as mergers and acqui-
sitions deserves further attention.
Endnotes
1. In the United States, safe harbor provisions for forward-looking statements in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 do not apply to IPOs. As a result, 
earnings forecasts in U.S. IPO prospectuses are very rare (Berger 2002).
2. The IPO pricing process begins after setting the preliminary offer price. The 
underwriter starts by collecting information about investor demand for the shares 
during a road show or an auction. Any positive information about investor demand is 
used to adjust the preliminary offer price upward to arrive at the final offer price. On 
average, the market price on the first day of trading exceeds the final offer price such 
that investors that were allotted shares in the IPO earn a positive first-day return. This 
positive first-day return is known as IPO underpricing and is computed as (first-day 
market price  final offer price)/final offer price. This paper focuses on the early stage 
of pre-IPO valuation and not the later IPO pricing stage. We refer to Derrien and 
Womack 2003 for a more detailed description of the IPO pricing process in France.
3. A detailed description of the valuation techniques can be found in text books such as 
Damodaran 1994; Palepu, Healy, and Bernard 2000; and Penman 2001.
4. We identify technology firms following the approach of Loughran and Ritter 2004. 
High-tech companies are active in Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 3571, 
3572, 3575, 3577, and 3578 (computer hardware); 3661, 3663, and 3669 
(communications equipment); 3674 (semiconductors); 3812 (navigation equipment); 
3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, and 3829 (measuring and controlling devices); 3841 and 3845 
(medical instruments); 4812 and 4813 (telephone equipment); 4899 (communications 
services); and 7370, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). We 
collect SIC codes from COMPUSTAT Global Vantage and Worldscope Disclosure.
5. Reading through the analyst reports we found that the price discount is indeed often 
advertised to entice investors to buy the stock. For example, one analyst writes: “The 
preliminary offer price offers a substantial discount from our fair value estimate. We 
therefore issue a strong buy recommendation for this stock.”
6. When constructing the underwriter market share measure we combine local offices and 
take into account name changes of underwriters because of mergers and acquisitions in 
the underwriting industry. Our underwriter market share measure identifies the 
following top three underwriters: BNP Paribas, Crédit Lyonnais, and Société Générale. 
We base market shares on the original sample of 309 companies that went public 
during 1990–99.CAR Vol. 24 No. 4 (Winter 2007)
How Do Underwriters Value Initial Public Offerings? 12417. The average unconditional weights of each of the different value estimates are as 
follows: multiples valuation 43.9 percent, dividend discount model 23.9 percent, 
discounted cash flow model 21.8 percent, economic value-added method 5.8 percent, 
and underwriter-specific techniques 4.6 percent.
8. The most popular trailing and forward multiples in our sample are price–earnings 
ratios (used by 191 underwriters), followed by price-to-cash flow ratios (94 
underwriters), enterprise value-to-earnings ratios (56 underwriters), enterprise value-
to-sales ratios (56 underwriters), price-to-sales ratios (55 underwriters), and price-to-
book ratios (37 underwriters). We find that the average underwriter selects 6.3 peer 
groups on the basis of industry and/or size. In a typical valuation report, the 
underwriter aggregates the value estimates of the different multiples together into one 
value estimate. We therefore use the weight attached to this aggregate multiple 
valuation estimate in our analysis rather than the weights assigned to the individual 
estimates of each multiple.
9. The Nouveau Marché was established in 1996 to attract young and high-tech issuers. 
We find that only 4.6 percent of French listed firms with coverage on Worldscope in 
1996 can be classified as technology firms (using the Loughran and Ritter 2004 
definition). This made it difficult for underwriters to find a sufficient number of 
appropriate comparable firms. The multiples method may therefore have been more 
difficult to use when valuing Nouveau Marché companies during the initial years.
10. Results are available upon request from the author.
11. We test for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as augmented by 
Davidson and MacKinnon 1993. This test can be formed by including the residuals of 
each endogenous right-hand-side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a 
regression of the original model and then testing whether the coefficients on the 
residuals are significantly different from zero.
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